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Introduction 
     Japan has a rich history of inquiry into the role of 
the body and into embodied modes of knowing, 
particularly in the practice of meditation and its nexus 
with the creative, visual, and martial arts.  In the West, 
a consideration of the body and its role in modalities 
of knowing is often referred to as “feminist.”  The 
notable lack of study in the West regarding masculine 
embodiment is a promising endeavor (see Lakoff and 
Johnson).  An appreciation of the ontological status of 
the female body in a Judeo-Christian context and in its 
intimate relation with the operations of the mind in 
language, rhetoric, and meaning-making constitutes a 
field of inquiry which I intend to explore in the 
context of this article. 
The Christian Episteme : Figuring Mimesis in the 
Rhetoric of Interpretaion 
     Strategies of representation are intimately 
determined by the bodies of knowledge they evoke. 
What we are permitted to know is intimately 
connected with the epistemic context of one’s inquiry.  
Eric Auerbach, in Mimesis: The Representation of 
Reality in Western Literature (1953), has located a 
characteristically Western, Judeo-Christian strategy 
for representation in his elucidation of “figural 
interpretation” (73).  Characteristic of medieval 
European literature, figural interpretation is an 
interpretive dynamic constructed by two “poles”- the 
figure and its fulfillment (195-6).  The figure consists 
in the master plot as found in the text of the Bible; the 
Fall of Adam, the Birth of Christ and the Last 
Judgment.  The fulfillment consists in the unfolding of 
this divine plan in historical time.  The figure and its 
fulfillment are  creatively  joined   to  produce  figural 
realism through what Auerbach calls “vertical links,” 
whereby “every earthly event and every earthly 
phenomenon is at all times -- independently of all 
forward motion -- directly connected with God’s plan” 
(194).  Figural thinking, as a Judeo-Christian method 
of interpretation, and as “consistently applied to the 
Old Testament by Paul and the Church Fathers, 
conceives of Adam as a figure of Christ, of Eve as a 
figure for the Church, just as generally speaking every 
event and every phenomenon referred to in the Old 
Testament is conceived as a figure which only the 
phenomena or events of Christ’s Incarnation can 
completely realize or ‘fulfill’” (195).     
     As Auerbach sees it, figural realism implies an 
inherent “rigidification of categories,” as this strategy 
for representing reality consists in a valorization of the 
vertical over the horizontal (116).  With an emphasis 
on the figural fulfillment of God’s plan (the vertical) 
events of this world and their fleshy manifestations are 
no longer perceived as ‘reality,’ but as signification; 
and earthly connections pale in relation to the divine 
plan “of which all occurrences are parts and 
reflection” (555).  This Judeo-Christian world-view 
would consist simply in an interesting exercise in 
hermeneutics, but for the Bible’s claim to truth, which, 
as Auerbach puts it, is “tyrannical” (14). Scripture 
stories “seek to subject us, and if we refuse to be 
subjected we are rebels” (15). Citizens of a figural 
reality are trained to be suspicious of materiality, of 
the body, and of modes of knowledge grounded in a 
lived experience of the sensory, for it is the world 
beyond; the abstract, the unseen world which consists 
in God’s design undergoing its own active fulfillment 
as prefigured in the Bible.  Puritans in particular, by 
subjecting their own lives to the stories of the Bible, 
sought an interpretive transformation and a general 
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method for comprehending reality based on figural 
interpretation. 
      What figural realism consists in is a disavowal of 
the sensory, earthly, horizontal axis of (lived) 
experience, and a valorization of the abstract (vertical). 
The vertical links which join these two worlds provide 
apertures for comprehension, but the frames of these 
apertures are narrow indeed.  For the Puritan episteme, 
sensory manifestations were bent on entrapping, 
ensnaring and deceiving one traveling along the path 
toward fulfillment (salvation).  The apprehension of 
these vertical links, and the experience of ‘vision’ 
through which one is swept into this updraft of 
interpretive energy, constitutes a spiritual 
comprehension  which is the very basis of the Judeo-
Christian world-view.   
      The tradition of figural interpretation reaches back 
to Plato’s Republic, not only with Plato’s notions of 
what constitutes the feminization of materia, but also 
in Plato’s Theory of Forms, wherein the material, 
earthly world is constructed as a representation, in the 
sense of a secondary (less ‘true’) manifestation of the 
ideal, unchanging forms which reside in an abstract 
reality available only to the faculty of reason.  For 
Auerbach, mimesis, as a strategy for the representation 
of ‘reality,’ has much in common with the dynamic of 
figural interpretation, for both mimesis and figural 
interpretation are strategies for representing a world 
which is constructed as the shadow for that which is 
better, greater, and lies beyond lived experience.  
     The Buddhist Episteme : Hongaku and the 
Provisionality of Rhetoric 
      In contrast to mimesis, and to the figural reality of 
a Judeo-Christian world-view, there is a fundamental 
Buddhist epistemic mode found in the dynamic of 
hongaku, or original enlightenment (Jp.ᧄⷡ). To read 
a Buddhist text such as the Lotus Sutra is to read an 
experience of enlightenment and to apprehend an 
enlightened state.  Interpretation as a means toward 
fulfillment in the Judeo-Christian tradition of the 
Western world-view is, in the case of the Lotus Sutra,
replaced by the apprehension of a text which is both
the means to and the ends for enlightenment.  The 
dynamic of figural interpretation is, from the point of 
view of the Lotus Sutra, entirely absent.   
     LaFleur notes that there is a tendency to read the 
Lotus Sutra “as merely a sequence of elegant pictures 
without much real substance” (87).  This appraisal is 
certainly understandable from the point of view of a 
reader who is positioned wholly in a figural reality 
where he or she is trained to interpret what lies behind 
the sensory data on the page, and well beyond the 
vibrant images apprehended by the mind.  This is not 
to say the Lotus Sutra is without parable and allegories, 
but the mechanism for reading these stories consists in 
calling attention to the ephemeral nature of these 
rhetorical modes as expedient modes (Jp.ᣇଢ: hôben)
presented to the reader/listener from the position of a 
narrator who is already in an enlightened reality which 
cannot be fixed in words.  LaFleur uses the term “self-
reflexive allegory” to point to the capacity of the Lotus 
Sutra to open one to a reading process which 
constitutes an apprehension of inner experience and, 
in this capacity, the reading provides for a radical 
subjectivity through an apprehension of ones 
consciousness of openness to the play of form, be it 
rhetorical, experiential, parabolic, or otherwise.   
      Ralph Flores articulates a similar notion in his 
discussion of Buddhist rhetoric when he notes that 
“traditional ‘rhetoric’ becomes something other than 
itself; it becomes self-subverting, indicating its status 
to be fictional, allegorical, ungrounded -- in short, 
theatrical ” (emphasis added) (84).   In this conception 
of discursive structures, the vehicle is no longer the 
servant of the tenor, and “the illustration is in no way 
subordinate to what it illustrates” (LaFleur 87).  
Means and ends collapse; there is nothing to interpret, 
nothing to see through or to see beyond, and there is 
no darkness, no opacity of material forms through 
which our Western gaze must penetrate.   Readers 
who position themselves amidst the logic of 
enlightenment recognize reality and divine knowledge 
to be fundamentally interpenetrating, consisting in a 
mutually referential relationship that is non-
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hierarchical.  The play of form unfolds, reality 
happens, but this is a reality which is very different 
from that which is constructed through figural 
representation. 
      Enlightenment, as a state of fulfillment already 
embodied in all human forms (hongaku), is then 
indistinguishable from the material modalities through 
which human beings (indeed all sentient beings) locate 
themselves.  From the point of view of figural realism, 
this perspective of ontological egalitarianism is often 
perceived as an abolition of dualism (tenor/vehicle, 
subject/object, mind/body) and can be rendered as a 
“flattening out” of the visual perspective.  Auerbach’s 
musings in his inaugural chapter, “Odysseus’ Scar,” 
are interesting in this respect.  It is no accident that 
Auerbach has chosen a scene incorporating strategies 
for representing the body to distinguish a style of 
representation in which “the complexity of the 
psychological life is shown only in the succession and 
alternation of emotions; whereas the Jewish writers 
are able to express the simultaneous existence of 
layers of consciousness and the conflict between 
them” (13).  While a useful trope in figural reality to 
indicate the dynamic of grappling with the heroics of 
interpretive thought, the notion of conflict and of a 
confrontation with oppositional forces is, from the 
context of a Buddhist hermeneutics, considered 
illusory and the product of unenlightened thinking.   
     Classical Western mimesis, and the notion that 
representations of (figural) reality are subject to higher 
or better planes of interpretation, is intimately 
involved with the visual analogy of perspectival space 
where there is the one, privileged, all seeing eye, who 
oversees the contents of the picture plane as through 
the visual trope of a window.  In this image of figural 
realism, visual information travels along one trajectory, 
toward the eye of the beholder.  Auerbach refers to 
this trans-historical positionality as a “subjectivist-
perspectivist procedure,” finding it entirely absent in 
the works of Homer (7).  From an enlightened 
perspective this subjectivist-perspectivist procedure 
exists, but is nonetheless illusory.  The viewer 
(subject) is no more valorized than the subject position 
of that which is being perceived (object).  This 
collapse of dualism in the logic of the Buddhist 
episteme results in what LaFleur refers to as a 
̌renewed simplicity rather than a naïve simplicity ̍
and in the redirection of attention to phenomena for 
their own sake (23).  
     The call to direct our attention to the material 
phenomena of the body and to the body as a site for 
material practice is necessitated for two reasons.  In 
the first place, the body is the site upon which 
ideology is mapped and, as such, figures as a 
symbolic/semiotic construction in that very process.  
There is simply no other means to receive, or to 
encounter the world around us than through the body. 
“As a being-in-the world, a person can live only under 
the fundamental restriction of having a body,” a body 
that is always placed in relationships to beings other 
than oneself, that is, to other people and to physical 
objects (Yuasa 50).  To put the body ‘at play’ in 
discursivities is first to re-cognize not only the 
instability of gender identification but to encounter 
one’s body as a field of communal, interconnected 
meanings and to experience both the provisionality of 
that subjectivity as well as the specificity of that 
subject’s position in the world.  In the second place, 
the self cannot act without the body, and amidst such 
contested and dangerous discursive domains as those 
where we find ourselves positioned today, it behooves 
us to think through ourselves in what I call (and others 
have called) lived experience (Jp. ૕㛎 or taiken), that 
is, experience (and I include thinking as experience) 
lived through a body which serves not only as a 
material sign but also as a space for material practice. 
Lived experience is at the nexus of a number of bodies 
of thought, including Yuasa Yasuo (see The Body: 
Toward an Eastern Mind-Body Theory, especially 
chapter two), Elin Diamond (Unmaking Mimesis,
especially chapter six in what Diamond, via Teresa de 
Lauretis, thinks of as ‘exoteric experience’) and in the 
work of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson.  Lakoff 
and Johnson have done significant work in 
repositioning the body in relation to Western 
conceptual systems through their (re)examination of 
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the dynamic in Western culture between metaphorical 
thought, the embodiment of mind, and the cognitive 
unconscious.  
Scholarship on Allegory in the West 
     As one might imagine, contrasting Judeo-Christian 
and Buddhist strategies for representing reality and for 
the role of rhetoric in apprehending that reality have 
ramifications, not only on the use of parabolic speech, 
but also on the nature of what can be rendered 
epistemologically visible.  While allegory in the 
Buddhist episteme was understood to be a provisional, 
expedient modality, and a staged medium meant to 
serve as a means to inner realization which was then 
discarded, allegory in the West developed into a 
highly charged, transformative, interpretive practice 
which afforded access to the universal, salvatory 
powers of a divine plan.  
     The etymological root for the word ‘allegory’ is 
based in the (Grk.) allos, meaning “other” and (Grk.) 
agoreuein meaning “to speak publicly” (as in the 
“agora” or marketplace).  To speak (write) 
allegorically then is to speak otherwise in a public 
fashion, in other words, to speak another (hidden) 
meaning at the same time that one is speaking for all 
to hear.   
     Ernst Robert Curtius, in European Literature and 
the Medieval Ages (reprinted 1990), makes a 
distinction between allegory and allegoresis: allegory 
is a useful means of distinguishing literary works 
which can be reliably grouped into the genre, and 
allegoresis is the use of allegory as a mode of thinking 
(of which figural interpretation is a Judeo-Christian 
manifestation).  In the former, allegory is allegorical 
narrative; wherein an interpretation already adheres in 
the fictional narrative (be it drama/Everyman,
poetry/Faerie Queen, prose fiction/Pilgrim’s Progress
or epic/Divine Comedy), and in the latter, allegoresis 
is a mode of thought, a mode of thinking characteristic 
of interpretation as a whole. From Auerbach’s 
perspective allegoresis is tantamount to figural 
interpretation, albeit in a Judeo-Christian religious-
cultural context wherein the jettisoning of a sensuous 
apprehension of an earthly embodiment (in the market 
place) is required for the apprehension of the heavenly 
truth of the (hidden) divine. 
     Frye in Anatomy of Criticism (1957) alluded to the 
confusion between allegory (as a genre) and 
allegoresis (as a mode of thinking) when he made the 
observation that all literary criticism is, in some sense, 
allegorical – in that literary criticism tells us what the 
text means, i.e., what is hidden.  What Frye is alluding 
to here is actually allegoresis, or the type of thought 
characteristic of literary criticism, a criticism which is 
characterized by interpretation.  Allegorical narrative 
is distinctive because the reader is aware (as they read) 
that there is an interpretation already built into the text 
that she is called upon to understand. Literary 
criticism involves an interpretive dynamic, but does 
not usually belong to the genre of allegory and is 
considered wholly different from allegorical narrative.  
The (con)fusion of allegory (genre) and allegoresis 
(mode of thinking) is characteristic of scholarship on 
the study of allegory. 
     Edwin Honig defined allegory as a genre in Dark 
Conceit: The Making of Allegory (1959) when he 
appropriated Edmund Spenser’s appellation for his 
“Faerie Queen” (1598) as a ‘darke conceite.’  Honig 
dwelt on the revelatory characteristics of Homeric 
allegory in that the poet/divine spoke allegorically in 
order to share an experience of the sacred through 
divine inspiration, amidst the need to maintain 
profundity through the dynamic of hiding.  Over the 
next 20 years a series of works were published on the 
nature of allegory.  Angus Fletcher (1964) made the 
claim that allegory was not a genre but a mode of 
thought; Michael Murrin with his Veil of Allegory
(1969) concurred. Gaye Clifford, in The 
Transformation of Allegory (1974) agreed with 
Fletcher in that allegory is a mode of thought 
(allegoresis) – though she differed with Fletcher in 
claiming that allegory took specific forms.    
      Maureen Quilligan cleared up a good deal of 
confusion between allegory as a genre and allegoresis 
as a mode of thought while bringing the investigation 
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of allegory full circle by declaring allegory a genre, 
just as Honig had done 20 years before. Though 
Quilligan in her Language of Allegory  (1970) agreed 
with Honig, her viewpoint (as one adumbrating post-
structuralist thought) contributed significantly to my 
own inquiry into allegory, in part because she clearly 
delineates between allegory and allegoresis, and 
situates her interest at the nexus of allegory and 
interpretative practices (allegoresis).  As allegorical 
narrative has an interpretation already built into the 
text, the reader’s responsibility is to become self- 
aware as to his or her interpretive practices, and to 
become alert as to how he or she (correctly or 
incorrectly) reads the allegory. Quilligan’s study 
culminates in an inquiry into the dynamic of 
interpretive practice and in an inquiry into the nature 
of how language makes meaning; i.e., into language 
itself.
Allegory Through the (Western) Ages 
      The roots of allegorical narrative in the West lie 
with Homer, with Virgil, and in Cicero’s The Dream 
of Scipio wherein both a personification of natural 
forces and the cloaking through fables afford another 
reading available to those who are capable of hearing 
it.  According to Curtius, allegoresis developed in the 
early 6th century as a means for the Greeks to absorb 
Homer’s texts (Homeric allegoresis) (204-5).  This 
interpretive strategy was then transferred to the Jewish 
hermeneutics of the Old Testament and thereby 
appropriated as the Judeo-Christian allegoresis (figural 
interpretation) characteristic of the Church fathers.  In 
a Judeo-Christian context, allegoresis traces its 
beginnings from Prudentius’s (384-410? C.E.)  
Psychomachia (in the use of allegorical figures from a 
Christian world-view) to its fruition in the Middle 
Ages with the doctrine of multiple meaning in the 14th
century as articulated in Dante’s Il Convito (2nd bk, 1st
ch.).  Dante (con)fuses allegoresis with allegorical 
narrative when he instructs readers of his Divine
Comedy to travel through a hierarchy of meaning by 
moving from the literal, to the allegorical, to the moral, 
and finally to the anagogic. 
     In the late Renaissance, the Judeo-Christian notion 
of the (Christian) divine as permeating all of creation 
served as a powerful proposition which established 
both the common ground and the scaffolding for 
allegory in the early 17th century.  Before the middle 
of the 17th century and in the figural realism of a 
Judeo-Christian world-view, allegory was provided 
with an assured and informed readership wherein the 
reading public maintained a common base of 
assumptions with which to encounter and to read an 
allegorical text in order to experience its (Christian) 
significance.  Dante’s Divine Comedy, William 
Langland’s Piers The Plowman, and Sir Gawain and 
the Green Knight, for example, though differing 
widely in genre and content, were allegorical 
narratives which were collectively understood.  
With the English Revolution (1640-60), the 
“world turned upside down” and the technique of 
allegoresis (not allegorical narrative) was espoused by 
the Dissenters of the day (Ranters, Diggers, Levellers 
and Quakers) to subjectivize their readings of the 
Bible.  With allegoresis, individuals felt empowered to 
read the Bible as they saw fit.  It was now permissible 
to disobey the tenets of the Bible so long as the 
individual’s interpretation was felt to be the reading 
appropriate for oneself. 
This sounded the bell for the end of an age of 
allegory.  Jonathan Swift in his “A Tale of a Tub” 
(1704) parodies the very notion of allegoresis [now 
associated with the enthusiastic zeal of the 
Roundheads and their vociferous (if not vituperative) 
interpretive force] in the figures of Peter, Martin, and 
Jack.  For Swift, the issue is not that of interpretation 
but of the very notion of involving readers in making 
any sort of meaning at all from a text (here the Bible).  
Swift adumbrated a change in English readers relation 
to language and to the rise of the New Science where 
the ‘one word/one thing’ notion of rhetoric meant that 
words became, not revelations with the authority of 
“Logos,” but transparencies through which one 
gathered empirical ‘data’ in the interest of experiment 
and observation. 
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  Rhetoric was now under deep suspicion (and no  
wonder after the trauma and chaos of the Interregnum), 
and Judeo-Christian allegory, where there is so much 
distance between tenor and vehicle, gave way to the 
fashion of symbolism (where tenor and vehicle are 
closer and tend to overlap) in the works of the 
Romantics in the later 18th century. 
      Allegorical narrative continued in this modern 
guise with Nathaniel Hawthorne (Scarlet Letter),
Herman Melville (The Confidence Man), Franz Kafka 
(The Trial, and others), Thomas Pynchon (The Crying 
of Lot 49), and James Joyce (Ulysses).  What remains 
constant in the West amidst changing cultural notions 
about the ability of language and rhetoric to tell 
“truth” lies in the ability of allegorical narrative to 
deploy an articulation of the sacred, even if that 
“sacred” leaks from its Judeo-Christian crucible to an 
articulation of the ability to get through life one day at 
a time. The figure of Leopold Bloom (Ulysses)
presents a notion of the sacred in an achievement of 
happiness through one’s ability to live well within 
one’s own chosen fiction. 
Allegory, Interpretation and Post-structural Thought 
     What is interesting about the relationship between 
post-structural thought and allegory is that allegory is 
now studied as a site for interpretation, not only as a 
vehicle to dramatize the ways in which human beings 
form interpretations of texts, but also as a site to 
interrogate the degree to which we, as humans, can 
control our own meaning-making.  Allegorical 
narrative contains allegoresis -- the interpretation is 
already embedded in the text, and it is the reader’s 
responsibility to interpret the text accordingly.  In this 
way, and paradoxically, allegorical narrative is 
particularly unsuited to allegoresis because the 
interpretation is already a part of the narrative.   With 
allegoresis already contained in allegory, allegorical 
narrative is a genre which calls upon the reader to 
distinguish the particular ways allegory makes 
meaning and calls attention to rhetoric itself.  Allegory 
has been reclaimed by post-structuralists for this 
reason – in reading allegory the reader is brought to 
the self-awareness of how he or she makes meaning 
and to the drama of the act of reading itself.   
          Post-structuralist contributions to a study of 
allegory lie in an awareness that the “text” is not 
simply what is on the page but encompasses a broad 
process of meaning- making, indeed, text (semiology) 
and the deployments of  “text” (for a post-
structuralist) adhere in the world at large.  This move 
in the study of allegory, to an emphasis on how 
meaning is made, is an interesting turn (as seen in 
Quilligan) because allegory involves the reader as a 
reader of signs and, when done well, draws him/her 
into a self-conscious awareness of how they read 
meaning. Post-structuralism and allegorical narrative 
coincide  (in allegoresis) in that they both draw our 
attention to interpretive practice.   
What one now sees in pedagogy of allegory is an 
awareness that allegory, in speaking publicly of the 
other, is speaking (on the page) of the ways in which 
language contains ‘other’ and in drawing attention to 
its own polysemousness.  Puns, analogies, proverbs, 
and emblems are all tools through which language 
proliferates in ways we never wholly control, and yet, 
at the same time, it is this ‘lack of control’ through 
which language provides the reader with access to an 
experience of the sacred.  
Allegory and Feminist Criticism  
            Honig notes in his Dark Conceit that allegory 
found much of its stimulus in the need to sublimate 
the feminine (allos/other) in the act of making public. 
Ian Miller in Allegory, Myth and Symbol (1981) and in 
his article, “The Two Allegories,” notes how germaine 
the scene of the Incarnation is to the dynamic of 
allegory.  The notion of the female body as 
incarnating the body of Christ seems to have led to a 
fair amount of anxiety in the thinking of early 
Christian theologians as they wrestled with the 
dynamics of desire in the relation between word 
(logos) made flesh or (more notably) flesh made word 
and the implications this dynamic may have on the 
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valorization of an embodied female spirituality. The 
absence of any coherent, sustained representation of 
female figures in the Judeo-Christian religious 
tradition and their absence from the “master plot” of 
figural realism is, perhaps, a product of this palpable 
anxiety with regard to the representations of female 
bodies desirous of union with the (Judeo-Christian) 
divine.  Indeed, it would appear that the ontology of 
figural representation and that of allegory itself are 
deeply enmeshed in the Judeo-Christian tradition and 
in the need to construct an allos which is itself a 
product of the desire to closet representations of an 
embodied (specifically female) desire.   
             The impetus to “hide” the material body, and 
in particular, to hide the hearing/reading of the Song of 
Songs as the only unmediated, frankly desirous female 
body in the Bible was characteristic of early Jewish 
theologians.  This refusal to acknowledge the 
epistemological visibility of a woman in the raptures 
of desire for her beloved led the Church fathers to 
allegorize the Song of Songs – determining a ‘correct’ 
(albeit hidden) meaning for the Christian readership in 
that what was ‘really’ indicated was the nature of 
God’s love for Israel (Judeo) or Christ’s love for his 
church (Christian).  The need to shrink from and to 
hide the force of female desire in the figure of Mary 
(lover of God, mother of Christ) has given much 
impetus to allegory and to the need to see beyond 
(around, behind, but in all events ignore) the 
epistemological visibility of material bodies.  It would 
appear that (in the Judeo-Christian tradition) that 
which is hidden (allos) is not simply material, 
sensuous, nor embodied experience, but is gendered 
feminine.  
          Nonetheless, the tradition of desire in the Judeo-
Christian world-view in the figure of the female who 
can and does experience lust (for the divine) did 
resurface in writings of the 17th century – in particular 
as Stanley Stewart observes in The Enclosed Garden
in Andrew Marvell’s poem “The Garden” (1681).  The 
allegory of the garden—as representing the body 
inviolate of the female in ecstatic union with the 
divine—was (according to Stewart) a prevalent notion 
during the 17th century.  Guillaume de Lorris and Jean 
de Meun’s Romance of the Rose also dealt with 
allegory as a means of representing female desire, but 
the misogynist tendencies of the second part turn this 
allegory to parodic dimensions. 
Given the historically contentious relationship 
between allegory and the female body, perhaps it is no 
accident (given the relationship between the female 
and allegory) that female experience (as embedded in 
an allegorical narrative) has been rendered so 
uniformly invisible in Judeo-Christian scholarship.  I 
would like to argue that the epistemological 
invisibility of the body in the Christian episteme in the 
West as compared to the epistemological visibility of 
the body in the Buddhist episteme in Japan, is 
generated at least in part by a Judeo-Christian “lens” 
through which female bodies (and, indeed the bodies 
which we all inhabit) in so far as they are subjected to 
allegorical or figural strategies of representation are, 
quite literally, inconceivable.   
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